This paper introduces a multiple quantile utility model of Cumulative Prospect Theory in an ambiguous setting. We show a representation theorem in which a prospect is valued by a composite value function. The composite value function is able to represent asymmetric attitude on extreme events and a rational prudence on ordinary events.
Introduction
In 1992 Tversky and Kahneman [47] introduced Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), which conjugated sign-dependence with rank-dependent utility, and solved the violation of stochastic dominance that occurred in their Prospect Theory [18] . In CPT prospects or lotteries were defined in terms of gains and losses with respect to a (neutral) reference point and the decision-maker (DM) had asymmetric risk attitude, generally risk aversion with respect to gains and risk seeking with respect to losses.
Major drawbacks have been put in evidence in representation of gain-loss asymmetry through CPT. Gains and losses are defined with respect to a certain and unique reference point (endowment or status quo). Distortion of probabilities, obtained through a probability weighting function attached cumulatively to outcomes, were used to maximize the overall value of a prospect, but a lottery with finite expected value may have infinite subjective value (St. Petersburg paradox) given a concave value function in gains [41] , or the DM may consider very high probability events as certain [1, 21, 48] .
In recent years the critical assumption of unique and certain reference point has been relaxed to cope with some real observed phenomena such as buying insurance or selling stocks. Therefore new versions of CPT, which generalize the reference-dependent subjective expected utility by introducing reference point as lotteries [26, 46] or more simply recognizing the possible use of multiple reference points in judgments [6, 33] , have been introduced. Incoherence and inconsistency observed in choice involving extreme events have been explained by suggesting different weighting functions [40, 49] , assuming the existence of a positive (contingent) recency effect, such as oversensitivity to recent outcomes [2] , or more radically concluding that the DM is not an utility maximizer of some generalized expectation [33] . 1 We introduce a new version of CPT under ambiguity, by involving a rank among outcomes and disregarding any consideration about preferences. This allows to connect the existence of a reference set with the human behavior facing extreme outcomes. Experimental evidence and field studies [20, 42] put in evidence that people has ambiguity aversion (pessimism) when face catastrophic losses (i.e. the US production of one thousand solid-fueled Minuteman missiles because of the supposed favourable ICBM gap of URSS in the '60 and the pandemic human swine flu) and ambiguity seeking (optimism) with respect to the windfall gains (i.e. discovery of a new drug active against an incurable disease). Under ambiguity or epistemic indeterminancy, the DM does not face a known (reliable) probability distribution but attaches more than one subjective probability distribution over possible events [17] . In this framework, ambiguity is modeled through a set of probability distributions (multiple priors) in the core of a convex nonadditive probability or capacity. 2 The set of priors reflects the DM's assessment of the epistemic reliability (weight of evidence) of available information about the underlying uncertainty or creedal state and allows to represent the DM's attitude about it. In fact, "an additional advantage of cumulative prospect theory as compared to original prospect theory is that it can be also applied to uncertainty, i.e., the case in which probability of events are not given" [10, p. 137 ].
We introduce a formalization of CPT under ambiguity that relies on the idea that the DM has a set of outcomes called ordinary (familiar), because they are considered more reliable and closer to her experienced life, and two tails that include more uncertain and extreme (unfamiliar) events. As a result, our representation is coherent with 'discontinuity in the DM's preferences on prospects' resulting from action of "simple psychological categories like relief from fear of high losses or hopelessness due to unlikeness of high gain [that] may be experienced in a rather jumpy manner" [51] . The new representation permits to elicit a rank among prospects, which takes into account fat-tailed events, usually misvalued in standard approaches, due to cognitive insensitivity to small probability outcomes [11] . The new decision rule is less conservative with respect to formulations based on a convex combination of maxmin and maxmax approaches, which induce an overevaluation of extreme events and an underevaluation of ordinary events. In fact, the DM is supposed to be pessimistic with respect to purely catastrophic losses, ambiguity neutral on ordinary outcomes and optimistic with respect to purely windfall gains. 3 In addition, our representation is consistent with the recent experimental literature on CPT that shows the existence of a positive correlation of the DM's attitude about extreme outcomes and competence effect [14] .
On ordinary outcomes, the DM adopts diversification, an intuitive and consistent strategy for reducing likely loss, for deriving an appropriate probability distribution among the set of multiple priors. Since entropy reflects the diversification degree of a portfolio [50] , the DM makes use of the Maximum Entropy Principle to elicit that probability distribution. 4 Maximum entropy probability, which is a measure of conflict of evidence, can be considered a measure of the diversification degree and a rational form of prudence.
Because of tractability and theoretical soundness, we define the value function of a prospect as the Choquet integral of an appropriate quantile function. While such a formula already exists in the literature [15] , we propose a simpler direct expression, by which we obtain an inverse cumulative function that is summation of three different Choquet integrals and provides 'discontinuity in preferences'. The composite value function of a prospect has a very attractive characteristic: it is a platykurtic function. In fact, it is the flattest (least peaked) in the interval of ordinary outcomes, through maximization of entropy among all ones in the DM's probability set, it has the fattest (the most divergent) loss tail among all ones, since it maximizes the minimum expected value in the interval of unfamiliar losses and it has the fattest (the most divergent) gain tail among all ones, since it maximizes the maximum expected value in the interval of unfamiliar gains.
The paper is organized as follows: related literature and preliminaries are in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the composite value function of a prospect by a quantile function. Section 4 characterizes an operational notion of the Precautionary Principle able to represent the impact of catastrophic events on human communities. Section 5 shows a very simple application of the new decisional rule to an asset portfolio problem. Section 6 illustrates the case where the DM's ambiguity attitude is characterized through E-contamination of confidence. Here a priori information leads to the closest to uniformity probability distribution P 0 , but cautiousness forces the DM to envision an E-contamination υ of P 0 . Finally, we define a simpler approach where the DM's prior P 0 is only considered a credible probability even if not fully reliable, and the parameter E is the value that captures the confidence in the DM's assessment or the error in P 0 . Concluding remarks follow.
Related literature and preliminaries
It is straightforward to observe that extreme intervals of losses and gains call to mind a class of decision making models that assume security and potential factors in the determination of the DM's choices. Security level (SL) and potential level (PL) in preferences were introduced to accommodate generalized versions of expected utility theory and Allais paradoxes [13, 18, 29, 35] . Jaffray's model [29] induced an explanation of risk aversion by the certainty effect, in fact risk neutral decision makers at a given SL were necessarily risk averter, since they "never consider as favorable mean-preserving spreads of their probability distributions on the outcome set" [29, p. 195 ]. Gilboa [18] axiomatized an increasing function of the expected 2 Choquet [12] defined the notion of capacity or charge and Schmeidler [44] axiomatized Choquet expected utility to represent the DM's preferences under ambiguity. Gilboa and Schmeidler [19] suggested a cognitive interpretation of Choquet expected utility (CEU) with respect to a convex capacity by which the DM evaluated a lottery by computing the expected utility with respect to each possible probability in the core of the capacity and chose the minimal one. This interpretation allows to consider an application of CEU with respect to a convex capacity as an application of a multiple prior approach. 3 Basili et al. [3, 4] found out characterizations of the DM's behavior when she had ambiguity attitude with respect to catastrophic losses or windfall gains and ambiguity neutrality with respect to a set of ordinary outcomes. 4 The Maximum Entropy Principle was introduced by Jaynes [27, 28] to elicit the most unbiased or the most uniform distribution among all the possible ones in physics as a generalization of the classical principle of Laplace's Insufficient Reason.
utility and the minimum utility (worst consequence with positive probability). Lopes [35] introduced a SL-PL framework modeled by a decumulatively weighted value rule for both gains and losses. Cohen [13] elaborated an axiomatic model for a DM who took into account "simultaneously or alternatively the security factor and the potential factor". However, experimental literature and field studies put in evidence systematic violation of SL-PL models, "since SL-PL models reduce to expected utility preferences in the interior of the Marschak-Machina triangle, typical violations of expected utility theory elicited in the interior of the Marschak-Machina triangle cannot be accommodated by the original SL-PL models" [45, p. 279] . To improve the descriptive power of SL-PL models Schmidt and Zimper [45] rejected the assumption that the DM referred exclusively to the worst and the best outcome in a prospect, regardless of how small their were, and axiomatized thresholds in outcomes, so that "security or potential considerations become only relevant when the probabilities of bad, respectively, good, outcomes are not below some perceptual threshold level. Extreme outcomes with probabilities beyond these thresholds will be disregarded" [45, p. 280] . As a consequence in SL-PL models with thresholds levels, "good or bad outcomes with probabilities beyond these thresholds are ignored for the calculation of utility" [45, p. 280] . Crucially, empirical observations suggest that the DM does not ignore extreme outcomes but has a different attitude with respect to them [14, 16, 32] . In our approach the DM explicitly considers extreme outcomes in the set of catastrophic losses and windfall gains, but she has a different attitude with respect to them. In fact, the definition of the set of ordinary outcomes depends on outcomes and probabilities that determine the lower and upper tails in each prospect (unfamiliar outcomes). We obtain that, the quantile that includes ordinary outcomes, resembles a confidence interval, which is a measure of the variability degree of what the DM considers an ordinary outcome (more reliable and closer to experienced outcomes).
Let S be the set of states of the world and A a σ -algebra of events where A is a subset of 2
We consider a DM facing ambiguity modeled through a set of probability distributions in the core C(υ) of a convex capacity
We confine our model to (S, 2 S ) where S is finite, since a finite setting allows us to lean Jaffray's results [30] , as follow: the DM elicits the particular probability denoted π ∈ C(υ) that maximizes the entropy, in the set of ordinary outcomes. The probability π is the closest to uniformity and dominates any other probabilities in C(υ) for Lorenz ordering [36] .
That way for any given act X : S→R and (α, β)
determines the interval of cumulative probability between which outcomes can be considered as ordinary, we assume that the DM values outcomes between these two quantiles in an ambiguity neutral way by π . We furthermore model pessimism in the lower tail [0, α] , i.e., model the attitude of the DM who minimizes the expectation of X on this quantile with respect to all P ∈ C(υ), and symmetrically optimism in the upper tail [β, 1], through maximization of the expectation of X in this quantile with respect to all P in C(υ). A Quantile Utility Model (QUM) is used in decision theory by Mansky [37] and axiomatized by Rostek [43] , who provided a characterization in a Savage setting. In a risky set-up, a QUM can be summarized as follows: given a probability measure on the measurable space of outcomes and a fixed number γ ∈ (0, 1), the DM orders feasible alternatives with respect to the highest γ th -quantile of the induced cumulative probability distribution over outcomes. Given a lottery, the DM is assumed to maximize a fixed quantile of the utility probability distribution over outcomes and if γ = 0 or γ = 1, the optimal choice induced by the standard maxmin or maxmax decisional rule is obtained, respectively. Crucially and unsurprisingly, this decisional rule has a clear limit in discriminating among probability distributions, since the DM evaluates only a lottery by the fixed γ th -quantile realization, i.e., a single statistic, whereas she is not interested in what happens in a probability distribution outside the γ th -quantile, producing in such a way very large classes of indifference.
In this paper we extend QUM to more than one quantile through the interval of cumulative probability [α, β]. In a finite setting, that can be generalized to an infinite setting, we develop a simple quantile function suited for the computation of the composite value function of a prospect in term of lower tail, middle and upper tail outcomes. Our composite value function is monotone, constant additive and positively homogeneous, so it makes possible to rank all alternative lotteries, preventing any incomparability and a large indifference class. It is worth emphasizing that Kiefer [23, 24] proposed an incentive compatible method to elicit quantiles and introduced a maximum entropy approach when the assessed information consisted of quantiles for calculating minimum capital requirements provided for banks to assess credit and other risks (Basel II, B2 framework).
Choquet integral and quantile-functions
Let P be a probability on (S, 2 S ). Let us also recall that ∀X ∈ R S , the mathematical expectation of X w.r.t. P, E P (X) is equal to
X (p)dp. 5 To avoid confusion, it will be often useful here to write F P X instead of F X . 6 To avoid confusion, it will be often useful here to write
We now come to the Choquet integral. First we recollect some definitions.
Definition 2 (Choquet integral). Let X ∈ R
S and υ a capacity on A, the Choquet integral of X w.r.t. υ denoted X dυ is defined by
We intend now to introduce suitable definitions of the cumulative distribution and quantile-function of an act X with respect to a capacity υ.
Let us recall:
Definition 3. The dual capacity υ of a capacity υ is defined by υ(A)
We now introduce the following new definitions.
Definition 4. The cumulative distribution F υ
X of X with respect to capacity υ is defined by
The reader might be surprised that F υ X (x) would not be defined by υ(X ≤ x); but this definition is in accordance with the probabilistic case since if υ equals a probability P then F υ
will be clear in the sequel, when defining the pseudo-inverse of F υ X and using it as in the probabilistic case for retrieving the Choquet integral.
Definition 5. Define the quantile function
is non-decreasing and left-continuous. Again From this, we deduce:
(p)dp.
It is straightforward to check that denoting α 0 = 0, one gets
Therefore, writing F −1 instead of F υ −1 X , for the sake of simplicity, one obtains:
Theorem 1 expresses the Choquet integral as an integral of an appropriate quantile function. In this way an inverse cumulative function or a fat-tailed function is obtained. This composed inverse cumulative function is amenable to represent pessimism and optimism on extreme outcomes and ambiguity neutrality on ordinary outcomes.
Precautionary principle as a rule of choice with optimism on the upper tail and pessimism on the lower tail
Thus, according to the assumption, the DM faces ambiguity modeled by a convex capacity υ, i.e., a capacity satisfying the further requirement υ(
From the previous developments, it turns out that the DM will fix what she conceives as the lower tail and the upper tail, through her personal choice of α, β ∈ [0, 1], where α ≤ β, and therefore will compute the value of X ∈ R S through I(X) = I 1 (X) + I 2 (X) + I 3 (X), where:
(p)dp. It is worth noting that I(X) = E π (X) if υ = π a probability; I(X) = X dυ if α = 1 and I(X) = X dυ if β = 0.
First, we need to check that I satisfies some minimal requirements of consistency, which are monotonicity, i.e., X ≥ Y ⇒ I(X) ≥ I(Y ), constant additivity, i.e., I(X + a.S * ) = I(X) + a, ∀a ∈ R and positive homogeneity, i.e., I(aX) = aI(X), ∀a ≥ 0 and ∀X.
Proposition 2. I is monotone, constant additive and positively homogeneous.
Proof. Let us confine ourselves to checking monotonicity, constant additivity and positive homogeneity being straightforward. Let X ≥ Y , it is immediate that for any capacity υ, hence for any probability
Therefore by integrating w.r.t. p, one obtains I(X) ≥ I(Y ).
Let us determine the probability distribution π ∈ core(υ) that maximizes entropy. Jaffray [30] set that the natural candidate was the probability distribution closer to uniformity "in particular the smallest elementary probability should be as big as possible". Jaffray recursively defined a finite sequences of subsets in A, so that probabilities were attributed to elementary events in an increasing order, and the maximum entropy probability was determined directly. 8 Once the unique probability π has been selected, it is possible to define the DM pessimism with respect to outcomes in the lower tail and optimism with respect to outcomes in the upper tail. In fact, pessimism and optimism are defined with respect to the probability distribution that expresses ambiguity neutrality, i.e. π .
Let us make these statements precise.
Definition 6. The DM is pessimistic with respect to the lower tail if she overestimates losses and underestimates gains in this tail with respect to her most uniform probability π ∈ C(υ), i.e., if
Definition 7.
The DM is optimistic with respect to the upper tail if she underestimates losses and overestimates gains in this tail with respect to her most uniform probability π ∈ C(υ), i.e., if
Proposition 3. The DM is pessimistic with respect to the lower tail and optimistic with respect to the upper tail.
Proof. We just confine to prove the pessimistic side; the proof is similar for the optimistic one. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and recall
, ∀x ∈ R, and consequently
Proposition 3 shows that a DM who would value any act X through I(X), actually would exibit pessimism with respect to the lower tail and optimism with respect to the upper tail.
An application: the classical one-risky and one-safe asset portfolio problem
Let w > 0 be the initial deterministic wealth of the DM who may invest x ∈ [0, w] of her wealth in a risky investment offering random returns R ∈ [−1, +∞) here R = {r 1 , . . . , r i , . . . , r n }, and r is the sure return, r ∈ R + .
The investor aims at maximizing
So clearly the DM will invest in the risky asset if and only if I(R) > r in which case, her optimal investment will be
Note that the investment decision does not need that E π (R) > r, similarly E π (R) > r will not imply that the DM will invest in the risky asset.
This feature appears clearly in the particular example of Section 6 where π = P 0 is the uniform distribution. Since I(R) = Investing in the first case would be justified by an attracting asset with only positive returns and optimism w.r.t. windfall gains, not investing in the second case would be justified by an asset offering too huge negative returns in the tail and pessimism w.r.t. extreme losses. 8 To elicit π ∈ C(υ) consistent with the convex capacity υ, Jaffray considered the dual capacity υ. Starting with A 0 = ∅, he recursively defined a family of disjoint non-empty subsets A k of S, where k ≥ 1, by:
, he proved that the maximum entropy probability π in C(υ) is defined by π({s}) = α k when s belongs to A k , with indeed k ≥ 1.
Entropy maximization and E-contaminated probabilities
In Bayesian analysis, uncertainty in prior distribution can be modeled by using a class of E-contaminated probabilities, where the parameter E ∈ [0, 1] indicates the probability deviation from the prior P 0 . Following some recent developments of E-contamination approach under ambiguity in insurance, such as call spread with mixed regimes or insurance contract with rare events [7, 8, 31] , we consider the capacity υ obtained by the E-contamination of P 0 , such that υ(A) = (1 − E)P 0 (A), ∀A = S and E ∈ [0, 1] . Therefore under ambiguity we refer to E ∈ [0, 1] as the ambiguity attitude coefficient of the capacity υ [9, 25, 38] .
We first intend to show that for the particular convex case of E-contamination of a given probability P 0 , Jaffray's algorithm is particularly efficient since at most two steps are needed. This is illustrated in the next lemma.
Lemma. Let υ be the E-contamination of P 0 , and let π denote the maximum entropy probability in C(υ).
hence clearly the 'less diffuse' probability i.e. the maximum entropy probability in C(υ) is the uniform distribution.
Assume now that E ∈ (0, 1), therefore the first step of Jaffray's algorithm leads to (1) (see Footnote 8) . So if A 1 = S, π is completely determined in one step. Otherwise since for any 
then the direct application of Jaffray's algorithm leads to (2) . , one straightforwardly obtained π in one step, and therefore π is the uniform distribution.
We now come to the entire treatment of an example.
Let S = {s 1 , . . . , s i , . . . , s n } be the set of states of the world and assume a DM faces total ambiguity. In such a case, the DM might apply the Laplace's Principle of Insufficient Reason and model the prior as being the uniform distribution
, ∀i. Nevertheless the precautionary principle might lead her to envision the largest set of possible probability measures defined by the convex capacity υ being a suitable E-contamination of P 0 .
Since, P 0 ∈ C(υ) and P 0 is the uniform distribution, it turns out that clearly the most uniform probability π in C(υ) is P 0 . Let n = 100, E = 1 2
(so we consider a DM with a high level of ambiguity aversion, which will mean a high level of pessimism with respect to the lower tail and a high level of optimism with respect to the upper tail), and where the lower and upper tails are consistently defined, respectively, through α = We furthermore consider X ∈ R S such that X(s i ) = x i with x 1 < · · · < x i < · · · < x n . Let us first compute I 2 (X). [1, 100] and let us recall that F π −1 X (.) is left-continuous. It comes that I 2 (X) = 6% 5% x 6 dp + · · · + 95% 94% x 95 dp = x 6 +···+x 95 100 .
Let us now turn to the computation of I 1 (X).
Let us finally compute I 3 (X).
We have F υ ) = x n and I 3 (X) = 100% 95% x n dp = 5x n 100 . One finally obtains: . Note that this formula might appear meaningful, since in this simple case, due to strong pessimism for the lower tail and strong optimism for upper tail, the DM computes the value of X through the mathematical expectation of X with respect to the uniform distribution, by merely replacing outcomes in the lower tail with the worst outcome and outcomes in the upper tail with the best outcome.
A simpler model
The efficient algorithm proposed by Jaffray [30] to obtain π ∈ C(υ) is general but not immediate, so we introduce a simplified approach. Consider a credible probability measure P 0 ∈ C(υ), and assume that the degree of pessimism with the lower tail is E 1 , while the degree of optimism with respect to the upper tail is E 2 .
Therefore, denoting υ 1 the E 1 -contamination of P 0 and υ 2 the E 2 -contamination of P 0 , one might value act X through:
It is straightforward to check that this new functional again satisfies the minimal requirement of monotonicity, constant additivity and positive homogeneity.
Such a model would also allow the expression of asymmetric pessimism and optimism through, for instance, E 1 ≥ E 2 .
In fact simultaneous different degrees of ambiguity attitude can be expressed by allowing more than one contamination so that the model becomes more flexible [5] . It is worth noticing that the approach based on E-contaminated probabilities is not as precise as the Jaffray's algorithm, but our simple model can be interpreted as follow: (1 − E 1 − E 2 ) captures the notion of reliability of the chosen probability distribution P 0 and E 1 and E 2 measure the error in the elicitation of P 0 in C(υ), weighted by the asymmetric ambiguity attitude with respect to extreme outcomes [5] .
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we show a representation theorem in which a prospect is evaluated by a functional defined through quantiles. We use a couple of quantiles that define an interval of events that the DM considers familiar, in some sense ordinary with respect to her experimented life, and two tails that include extreme events, such as events with very small probabilities of occurring and very large consequences either positive (windfall gains) or negative (catastrophic losses). In this way, we are able to take into account both asymmetric attitude with respect to ambiguity on extreme events (optimism with respect to windfall gains and pessimism with respect to catastrophic events) and the DM's attitude considering entropy as a rule of inference, when information is ambiguous and scanty.
Our approach originates a probability distribution on the possible consequences of a given act that has an interesting shape: it is a platykurtic (fat-tailed) function. It is straightforward to extend our representation to financial markets where phenomena such as implicit volatility smiles on stock options (volatility varies across state and time to maturity) are extensively documented and stock returns indicate that extreme losses and gains are significant and have high chances of occurring [39] .
In the spirit of some recent development of the decision theory under ambiguity, we introduce an alternative method to define the composite value function of a prospect based on E-contamination of probabilities, a basic methodology in Bayesian robustness analysis. Finally, our representation theorem provides operational content to the precautionary principle by defining a rank among alternative acts, which combines conservative and dissipative behavior with the application of the principle of insufficient reason (one egg in each box), given the reliability of the probability distributions, and overcomes the failure of the full conservative measure, e.g., maxmin decisional rule.
